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 tors of art. Art faculty, she notes, should
 have the same freedom in research and
 publication as other faculty members,
 whether or not their ideas are offensive,
 but artwork exhibited for the academic
 community or the public cannot be
 wholly without restriction, though not
 of propriety or ideology. Acceptable
 rules "may include qualitative stan-
 dards, provisions for participation to be
 'refereed' or 'juried/ and general regula-
 tions on 'time, place, and manner/"
 Some years ago members of the
 AAUP staff amused themselves imagin-
 ing a series of television programs to be
 titled "From the AAUP Files!" Sheila
 Slaughter, after studying the AAUP case
 reports from 1970 to 1990, has come up
 with twenty-nine that she calls "Dirty
 Little Cases," five of which she com-
 ments upon at some length. Presumably
 none of them will be tapped for prime-
 time television. But it is gratifying to
 find a serious analysis of these extraordi-
 nary AAUP contributions to the history,
 sociology, and advancement of Ameri-
 can higher education. Slaughter finds
 certain common denominators among
 the twenty-nine cases, most particularly
 a conflict between administrators zeal-
 ous to preserve what they consider ad-
 ministrative prerogatives and faculty
 members seeking professional recogni-
 tion, largely through participation in the
 government of their institutions.
 Stressing the vital relationship of aca-
 demic freedom and the faculty role in
 institutional government is common to
 all these essays, and it is one of the
 book's most valuable contributions. It is
 given the fullest treatment in the
 Slaughter essay and the essays of David
 Rabban and Sandra E. Elman that fol-
 low it. Rabban, elaborating upon a sub-
 ject he has addressed earlier, concen-
 trates on separating the kinds of
 professorial speech that he believes
 should be protected under academic
 freedom from those that should not.
 Much speech, he notes, is protected by
 the First Amendment, and some is de-
 fensible on other grounds; but the justi-
 fication of academic freedom is its ben-
 efit to the public from the search for
 knowledge by specialized experts. Exer-
 cising the role outlined for the faculty
 in the Joint Statement on Government of
 Colleges and Universities, "which clearly
 draws on professional expertise to ad-
 vance the search for knowledge," is thus
 protected by academic freedom. Rab-
 ban contends, however, that faculty
 members and the AAUP itself have
 gone beyond that justification in claim-
 ing the protection of academic freedom
 for much extramural and intramural
 speech. From intramural speech he
 draws such examples as "complaints re-
 garding inadequate salaries, parking,
 and health and pension benefits." A pri-
 mary concern for him is that, without
 convincing justification, "decision mak-
 ers and judges [are less likely] to take se-
 riously the implications for academic
 freedom in close cases."
 Over the years academic freedom has
 clearly been expanded to protect much
 more than the freedom of the classroom
 and research. But probably most issues
 of consequence at a college or university
 have some bearing - to use Rabban's
 words - on the "specialized expertise of
 professors in advancing knowledge and
 critical inquiry." AAUP, in any event,
 has always borne in mind that faculty
 members are officers of their institu-
 tions; and, with that fact graved in the
 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
 Freedom and Tenure, it is hard to see
 why, when a faculty member speaks out
 as an institutional officer on parking,
 salaries, or fringe benefits, he or she
 should not be said to employ the protec-
 tion of academic freedom. Perhaps
 something may be lost in the courts, but
 much more is gained in the profession.
 A particularly interesting aspect of
 the Elman essay, "Academic Freedom
 and Regional Accreditation," is that it
 was written by an officer of a regional
 accrediting association. The AAUP es-
 tablished Committee D on Accrediting
 primarily to further AAUP objectives in
 academic freedom, tenure, and institu-
 tional government through the accredit-
 ing associations. Had the views ex-
 pressed in this essay - based largely on
 the New England Association's Stan-
 dards for Accreditation - been shared or
 implemented by the officers of those as-
 sociations thirty-five years ago, Com-
 mittee D would probably never have
 come into existence. Numerous pas-
 sages might be cited, but perhaps one
 will suffice to give something of the
 essay's flavor: "Faculty members are
 often steadfast in their intellectual com-
 mitment to a particular view. ... That
 these faculty are able to articulate and
 defend their views, irrespective of the
 fact that others disagree, is essential."
 These seven essays hardly can address
 every academic freedom question likely
 to arise in the everyday life of faculty
 members and administrators. But they,
 together with the editors' introduction,
 focus attention clearly and perceptively
 both on major current issues and on the
 enduring principles that distinguish the
 academic profession. The title of the
 volume is well chosen: academic free-
 dom is indeed an everyday concern.
 Social Science in the
 Crucible: The American
 Debate over Objectivity
 and Purpose, 1918-1941
 Mark C. Smith. Durham, N.C: Duke
 University Press, 1994, 353 pp., $49.95
 (cloth), $15.95 (paper).
 ROBERT C. BANNISTER
 WHEN THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
 dedicated its new Social Science Re-
 search Building ("Eleven Twenty-Six")
 in December 1929, speakers celebrated
 a new era in the social sciences. To the
 economist Wesley Mitchell, the build-
 ing symbolized the victory of the man
 of "facts" over the "man of hunches."
 John Merriam, president of the
 Carnegie Foundation and brother of
 one of Chicago's leading political scien-
 tists, predicted that such contentious is-
 sues as Prohibition and the tariff would
 "melt away" once social scientists col-
 lected sufficient data. For the inscrip-
 tion for the building's facade, the soci-
 ologist William Fielding Ogburn
 provided a paraphrase of Lord Kelvin's
 maxim: "When you cannot measure...
 your knowledge is... meagre [and]
 unsatisfactory."
 Not everyone was persuaded. "And if
 you cannot measure it, measure it any-
 how," one economic theorist grumbled.
 But for historians of the social sciences,
 the spirit of "Eleven Twenty-Six" even-
 tually translated into the view that a
 Robert C Bannister teaches history at Swarth-
 more College and is author of Sociology and
 Scientism: The American Quest for Objec-
 tivity 1880-1940 (1987).
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 "true quantitative, antinormative sci-
 ence of society" emerged in the interwar
 decades, triumphing after 1945. Mark
 C. Smith now challenges this "com-
 monly accepted interpretation" in a
 well-written collective biography of five
 prominent social scientists of the inter-
 war years: political scientists Charles
 Merriam and Harold Lasswell; econo-
 mist Wesley Mitchell; sociologist
 Robert Lynd; and historian Charles
 Beard.
 In their debate over objectivity and
 purpose, Smith argues, these figures di-
 vided into two camps, pitting "service
 intellectuals" (Mitchell, Merriam, along
 with more extreme "objectivists" such
 as Ogburn) against "purposivists"
 (Lynd, Beard, and Lasswell), the latter
 insisting that social scientists be guided
 by "preconceived goals and ends" which
 they themselves help formulate. For
 both groups the path between objectiv-
 ity and purpose proved to be a rocky
 one. Merriam, despite his frequent en-
 dorsements of quantitative, value-free
 social science, wrestled publicly and pri-
 vately with the conflict between the de-
 mands of scholarly detachment and so-
 cial activism, a tension, as Smith
 describes in a useful opening survey,
 that existed within American social sci-
 ence from its origins in the early 1 9th
 century. For Mitchell, ironically, the
 belief that empirical study would pro-
 duce change led finally to an "extreme
 empiricism unrelated to and even some-
 times opposing such reform." Merriam
 was also a study in contradiction: a the-
 orist who denied the value of theory, a
 quantifier who could barely calculate,
 and a politician who insisted that social
 scientists be apolitical.
 The purposivists, unwilling to jetti-
 son the ideal of objectivity, were equally
 conflicted. In "Written History as an
 Act of Faith," his presidential address to
 the American Historical Association
 (AHA) in 1933, Beard "insisted on...
 the scientific method. . .and critical uses
 of facts and sources," thus avoiding a
 total relativism even while arguing that
 the historian's perspective inevitably
 shapes interpretation. Lasswell, al-
 though later singled out as the epitome
 of the amoral technician, was even more
 systematic in his attempts to build a
 "purposive" social science on a strict
 empiricism.
 The outcome of this debate was not a
 happy one for either side. Mitchell and
 Merriam, despite their early commit-
 ment to reform, ended as high priests of
 value neutrality, unaware that their em-
 phasis on technique in its own way rep-
 resented "a clearly biased approach to
 the study of society." The purposivists
 were no more successful. Lynd's state-
 ment of "human needs" in Knowledge
 for What? (1939) was "painfully disap-
 pointing." Beard, although exposing the
 "ethical vacuum" at the heart of "objec-
 tivism," failed completely "to validate
 those personal values central to his own
 purposive approach." By the early
 1940s, Lasswell, for all the sophistica-
 tion of his individual and social psy-
 chology, adopted a value-free empiri-
 cism that seemed to justify an earlier
 characterization of him as "the new
 Machiavelli."
 Smith's book joins a growing litera-
 ture represented most notably by Peter
 Novick's That Noble Dream: The "Ob-
 jectivity Question "and the American His-
 torical Profession (1988) and Dorothy
 Ross's The Origins of American Social
 Science (1991). Like Novick, Smith
 places "objectivity" at the center of the
 story, rather than Ross's theme of
 "American exceptionalism." But, like
 Ross, he cuts across the disciplines, ar-
 guing that these social scientists shared
 a common discourse. If other earlier
 works (including my Sociology and Sci-
 entism [1987]) left an impression that
 the value-free ideal was unchallenged or
 emerged victorious by the late 1930s -
 and I believe Smith exaggerates the hold
 of this "conventional interpretation" -
 his detailed recreation of these debates
 demonstrates that value neutrality was
 hotly contested until events during and
 after the Second World War assured its
 ascendancy. By placing these five figures
 against the background of pre- World
 War social thought - particularly that
 of John Dewey, whose influence is per-
 vasive - Smith also locates them as links
 between early pragmatism and the re-
 cent revival of pragmatism by Richard
 Bernstein, Richard Rorty, and others.
 Smith's account is not without prob-
 lems. The dichotomy between "service
 intellectuals" and "purposivists," how-
 ever useful for dramatic purposes, over-
 simplifies the far more complex and in-
 teresting story he himself tells of
 often-agonized attempts of a generation
 of social scientists to honor both objec-
 tivity and commitment, empirical in-
 vestigation and personal values. Since
 the two groups do not divide along gen-
 erational, institutional, or even class
 lines, and since all five made statements
 at one time or other that could place
 them in either camp, Smith falls back
 on the problematic argument that the
 work of the different individuals "in its
 entirety" and "in the context of. ..be-
 havior... almost always [produces a]
 clear position." Despite passing refer-
 ences to a "purposive school," Beard be-
 comes "truly purposive," others being
 presumably less so. Although represen-
 tatives of the two camps sometimes
 clashed (Merriam and Beard over the
 conclusions of an AHA committee re-
 port on secondary education in 1926,
 for example, or Ogburn and Lynd over
 the latter's contribution to Recent Social
 Trends), conflict also occurred among
 "service intellectuals," notably Mer-
 riam's battle with Ogburn, also over the
 Recent Social Trends project.
 Smith's promise to explore the insti-
 tutional, professional, and personal con-
 text is only partially fulfilled. The
 educational foundations and overspe-
 cialization, sometimes in conjunction
 with personal ambition, take the usual
 blame for fostering a chilling value neu-
 trality. Thus Harold Lasswell, address-
 ing an increasingly specialized audience,
 and beset by career reversals in the late
 1930s, placed his technique "in the ser-
 vice of existing government and private
 industry." Lynd projected the small-
 town values of his youth as universally
 human. But on the whole the "failure"
 to negotiate the chasm between objec-
 tivity and commitment is described
 rather than explained, leaving one to
 wonder if these individuals would have
 gotten it right had they only been
 smarter - as with Beard's inability to
 "understand the intricacies of Dewey's
 logic" concerning scientific method,
 with Merriam's blindness to potential
 conflicts between politicians and ex-
 perts, or with Mitchell's "commitment
 to gathering facts and more facts."
 To his credit, however, and despite
 an occasional tendency to editorialize
 concerning the "bias" implicit in the
 ideal of "objectivity," Smith finally pro-
 vides a balanced, even sympathetic view
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 of his subjects. One reason, as he him-
 self suggests, is that his own career, be-
 fore landing him at the University of
 Texas at Austin, took him from college
 in the 1960s to a stint in clinical social
 work, a world where verifiable proofs
 and absolute solutions to specific prob-
 lems are at a premium. More impor-
 tantly, these "public intellectuals" of an
 earlier generation seem to him to be the
 more impressive when compared with
 some denizens of the contemporary
 academy. In a brief but provocative con-
 clusion, Smith takes aim at the
 "hyperspecialization" of experts who no
 longer worry about serving power; the
 failed promise of "critical theory"; and
 the excesses of poststructural theorists
 who "deny the validity of any knowl-
 edge and consequently [pay] scant atten-
 tion to empiricism or their own value as
 intellectuals" while at the same time hid-
 ing behind "abstruse language that
 makes Lasswell seem like Hemingway in
 comparison." By this standard, the ear-
 lier debate over objectivity and purpose,
 however flawed its participants may ap-
 pear, is eminently worth revisiting.
 Places of Inquiry: Research
 and Advanced Education in
 Modern Universities
 Burton R. Clark. Berkeley: University
 of California Press, 1995, 284 pp.,
 $40.00.
 PHILIP G. ALTBACH
 RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES ARE IN
 trouble in many countries. Budget cut-
 ters and government planners in Wash-
 ington, Sacramento, and Albany, not to
 mention London and Rome, seem to
 have forgotten that research-oriented
 universities have played a central role in
 the development of modern science and
 technology. It is argued that research
 can be conducted by private industry.
 In many countries, there is a surplus of
 doctorates in some disciplines. Budget
 cutting, stimulated by a movement to
 reduce public spending at all levels, is
 linked to the ideology of privatization.
 Philip G. Altbach (Education, Boston College)
 is the co-author of, most recently, The Aca-
 demic Profession: International Perspectives
 (1994).
 The forces arrayed against the universi-
 ties are powerful.
 Burton Clark's Places of Inquiry
 comes at an opportune time. Clark ar-
 gues for the importance of advanced
 scientific training and research as part
 of the central role of universities. He
 brings an international perspective to
 the topic and points out how research
 and advanced education have evolved in
 the academic systems of the United
 States, Britain, France, Germany, and
 Japan. Clark assumes the centrality of
 universities to modern scientific devel-
 opment and to research - an assump-
 tion that may no longer be shared by
 many in authority.
 Research is not an immutable part of
 the higher education enterprise. As a
 central function of the university, it
 dates back only to the establishment of
 the University of Berlin in 1810, based
 on the ideas of Wilhelm von Hum-
 boldt. The Humboldtian idea, with its
 reliance of Uhrfreiheit ana lernfreiheit -
 the freedom of the professor to teach
 his or her specialty and the freedom of
 the student to choose what to study -
 enshrined research.
 Places of Inquiry discusses the ways in
 which advanced study and research are
 carried out in five of the world's major
 academic systems. Although each of the
 countries discussed is technologically
 advanced, each has quite different ap-
 proaches to university-based research
 and training. Burton Clark is clearly
 partial to the American approach, with
 its large and highly differentiated sys-
 tem and a university structure based on
 departments and multidisciplinary cen-
 ters. He argues that this arrangement
 has helped ensure American scientific
 preeminence. He sees the American aca-
 demic system as the most successful in
 the world, and he admires its ability to
 absorb large numbers of students while
 at the same time maintaining elite, re-
 search-oriented institutions at the top.
 He implies that a weakening of this aca-
 demic infrastructure will inevitably re-
 sult in a downturn in American science
 and technology.
 The other four countries analyzed in
 this book have significant weaknesses in
 the provision of graduate-level educa-
 tion and research. Germany, which is
 the home of the Humboldtian univer-
 sity, saw its academic system dramati-
 cally weakened during the Nazi period.
 German scientific preeminence never
 reemerged. Clark points to the disjunc-
 tion between the government-funded
 research institutes (the Max Planck In-
 stitutes) and the universities. The insti-
 tutes are well funded and have excellent
 research facilities in the various disci-
 plines, while the universities tend to be
 overcrowded, with conditions deterio-
 rating. Clark argues that the existence
 of a strong nonuniversity research net-
 work tends to draw university-based re-
 search out of academic institutions, and
 that the German system deemphasizes
 advanced training in the universities.
 Of the countries considered in Places
 of Inquiry, Germany has the strongest
 research system after the United States.
 Clark points out that Britain, France,
 and Japan have seriously flawed
 arrangements for advanced education
 and research in the arts and sciences.
 Britain, with its strong Oxbridge under-
 graduate traditions, was late to develop
 graduate education. Programs were es-
 tablished outside of the traditional uni-
 versities at such places as University
 College, London, and the University of
 Manchester, only later were incorpo-
 rated into Oxford and Cambridge, and
 even now are in an uneasy relationship
 with the wealthy undergraduate col-
 leges. Recent developments in Britain
 have weakened academic structures
 painstakingly built up in the period fol-
 lowing the Second World War. The
 abolition of the University Grants
 Committee and, most recently, the up-
 grading of the polytechnics to university
 status, have weakened top-level training
 and research.
 The French university system was
 abolished during the French Revolution
 and reestablished by Napoleon with a
 purely teaching function. Further, the
 grandes écoles, which educate the French
 elites, do not have a significant research
 focus. As in Germany, there are some
 government-funded laboratories and in-
 stitutes outside of the university system,
 but these do not have organic links to
 the universities.
 Japan is an interesting case, especially
 for Americans, because of its persistent
 trade surpluses and the high achieve-
 ment of Japanese students in compara-
 tive tests of mathematics and science.
 By all accounts, however, Japanese
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